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OPTIMAL RISK–EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT WITH COSTLY
REFINANCING OPPORTUNITIES
ANDREA BARTH AND SANTIAGO MORENO–BROMBERG
Abstract. In this paper the decisions of a firm’s manager, in terms of exposure to a prof-
itable but risky technology, distribution of dividends and (costly) re–injection of cash to
ward off bankruptcy are studied. The analysis of the manager’s optimal choices is done
via a value function whose state variable is the firm’s current level of reserves. Contingent
on whether proportional or fixed costs of reinvestment are considered, singular stochastic
control or stochastic impulse control techniques are used.
1. Introduction
This aim of this work is to study the risk–exposure decisions of a firm’s manager, together
with his choice of distribution of dividends, in a framework where the firm’s shareholders have
the choice of refinancing the firm should its cash reserves become non–positive. The manager
chooses, continuously, an exposure strategy a ∈ [0, 1] that multiplies an arithmetic Brownian
motion and determines how risky/profitable the firm is at each date. Whenever the firm’s
cash reserves become negative it must be either liquidated (at a zero–recovery rate) or it must
be refinanced. Due to the presence of refinancing costs, cash re–injection is only exercised to
ward off bankruptcy. This process may be interpreted as well as costly issuance of equity.
Both the cases of proportional and fixed costs are considered. The former requires tools from
Singular Stochastic Control, whereas for the latter Impulse Control techniques are employed.
At each point in time, the manager maximizes the value of the firm, which is a function of
its current level of cash reserves, and corresponds to the discounted dividend stream net of
re–investment costs (there are no informational asymmetries issues considered in our model).
In contrast with the classical Merton problem, here investors are assumed to be risk neutral.
This implies that the set of feasible consumption–contributions strategies cannot be assumed to
consist of absolutely continuous processes. To the best of our knowledge, Radner & Shepp [13]
and Jeanblanc–Pique´ & Schiryaev [8] were the first ones to work in such a setting. In their
case, the risky project has a fixed size and no re–investment is possible. The manager then
faces the compromise of distributing too many dividends, which is inefficient due to bankruptcy
risk, or postponing distribution too long. The latter option prolongs the project’s lifespan, but
it is inefficient because of discounting. The authors show the optimal strategy is the following:
refrain from consumption as long as the cash reserves remain under a certain threshold x∗;
whenever the current reserves level x is greater than x∗, consume x − x∗ immediately. Since
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the level of cash reserves follows a diffusion process, this results in a localized optimal strategy.
The solution of the manager’s problem may be, therefore, identified with a Skohorod problem,
where the cash–reserves process is reflected at level x∗. The mathematical methodologies for
this kind of problems have been studied, for example, in [5] and [3]. The two main departures
from [13] and [8] found in the literature are:
• Introducing the possibility of varying the size of the risky project. Højgaard
and Taksar study in [7] a model of an insurance firm whose manager controls the
firm’s risk exposure via proportional reinsurance. This is translated into a stochastic
control problem where reinsurance is represented by a factor 1− α ∈ [0, 1]. The second
control variable, the cumulative distribution of dividends, keeps the firm’s cash reserves
below the optimal dividend–distribution barrier x∗. The possibility of continuously
tweaking the reinsurance level results in two additional (relative to [8]) boundary points
0 < x∗∗∗ < x∗∗ < x∗. Below x∗∗∗ there is partial reinsurance and on (x∗∗∗, x∗∗) there
is none. In the partial–reinsurance region, the optimal choice α∗ results in a reserves
level that follows a geometric Brownian motion: the proportion of reinsurance tends to
one as the reserves approach zero, thus preventing the firm from going bankrupt. The
model could also be interpreted as a Merton–style problem of optimal portfolio design,
where α represents the proportion of wealth invested in the risky asset, and where the
savings account pays zero interest. Rochet–Villeneuve [15] address a similar optimal
portfolio problem, but from the point of view of a corporation. They assume the firm’s
debt level is fixed and its reserves may not become negative. As a consequence the
amount of cash that may be invested in the risky asset is bounded above by the firm’s
current liabilities. Notice the departure from a proportional scenario in [7] to one in
nominal terms. Here debt and reserves accrue interest at the same (fixed) rate. This
feature, together with the non–proportional setting, results in a value function whose
corresponding HJB variational inequality cannot be solved in closed form. This issue
notwithstanding, the authors are able to show that the manager’s optimal strategy is
quite similar to that in [7]: invest a multiple of the firm’s equity into the risky asset,
keep the rest as cash reserves, and distribute dividends when the value of the firm
exceeds some threshold. The resulting value function is rational with exponent smaller
than one for low levels of equity, which the authors interpret as corporate risk aversion
stemming from the risk of bankruptcy. Interestingly, even though the HJB variational
inequality in [15] is more complicated than that in [7] and cannot be solved in closed
form, the structures of the solutions to both problems are quite similar.
• Introducing reinvestment possibilities. Natural extensions to [8] were considered
by Lokka and Zervos in [12] and by De´scamps, Mariotti, Rochet and Villeneuve in [4].
These authors allow for additional equity issuance under proportional or fixed trans-
action costs, respectively. In both cases closed form solutions for the firm’s optimal
balance sheet are given, and conditions for the viability of costly equity issuance are
found. Furthermore, in [4] the impact of financial frictions on firm governance in terms
of the model’s predictions is studied, as well as how these governance issues affect the
volatility of stock returns. The fixed–transaction–costs setting is further extended by
Akyildirim, Gu¨ney, Rochet and Soner in [1], where interest rates and issuance costs are
governed by an exogenous Markov chain. This provides insight, in a stylized model, on
how the business cycle affects managerial decisions and, mapping back to [4], stock price
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volatility. Jiang and Pistorius, in [9], analyze a model quite similar to [4], where instead
of (stochastic) reinvestment opportunities, the drift in the firm’s risky technology also
follows a Markov chain.
To the best of our knowledge, He–Liang [6] were the first ones to study the mixed case of
a firm whose manager may vary the exposure to the risky technology and may also decide
to issue additional equity. Their paper, situated within the insurance literature, is the most
similar to ours. They, however, take the boundaries x∗∗∗, x∗∗ and x∗ from [7] as given and
then analyze under which conditions it is optimal to re–issue equity in order to thwart off
bankruptcy. Only proportional issuance costs are considered. We also work in a model where
the manager may proportionally adjust the firm’s exposure to a risky production technology;
however, in contrast with [6], we solve the free boundary problems of finding the partial– and
full–exposure and dividend boundaries as a function of the re–investment costs, which may be
proportional or fixed. Indeed, we show that when the partial exposure boundary is optimally
adjusted to a proportional transaction cost, it is never the case that re–investment/re–issuance
is inefficient. We have chosen the proportional setting without a (profitable) saving technology
because it allows for closed–form solutions to the value functions and, more interestingly, for
(almost) fully analytical expressions for the free boundaries. As a consequence, we provide
conditions on the re–investment costs under which partial exposure disappears, and we are also
able to study the convergence properties of the value functions to the first–best case (when
costs decrease) and to the solution in [7] (when reinvestment becomes prohibitively costly).
Our model extends [7] by considering re–investment possibilities and [4] and [12] by allowing a
variable exposure to the risky investment opportunity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We describe in Section 2 the Basic Model
(Højgaard’s and Taksar’s) , without re–investment options, which we use as an initial building
block. The case of proportional costs of re–investment is studied in Section 3, whereas fixed–
costs are introduces in Section 4. For the sake of completeness, brief description of the solution
to the Basic Model is provided in the Appendix, where all our mathematical proofs can also be
found.
2. The Basic Model
We work in a continuous–time, infinite horizon setting and consider a firm whose manager has
the possibility to continuously modify the firm’s exposure to a profitable but risky investment
technology. We rule out any information asymmetries between management and equity holders;
therefore, the manager’s sole objective is to maximize the firm’s value. The latter is defined as
the expected, discounted dividend stream that the (risk–neutral) shareholders receive over the
firm’s lifespan.
In order to describe the dynamics of the cashflows generated by the exposure to the risky
technology, as well as the dividend payments, let us introduce the filtered probability space(
Ω,F , {Ft},P
)
. The process W (t) is a P–Brownian motion that generates the filtration {Ft}.
Let µ, s0 and σ be greater than zero, then the cashflows generated by full–risk exposure are
given by the SDE
dS(t) = µdt+ σdW (t), S(0) = s0.
The manager’s decisions regarding risk exposure are represented by the predictable process
{a(t) ∈ [0, 1]}, which we shall call an exposure strategy. A cumulative dividends process is any
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non–decreasing, adapted and ca`gla`d process {L(t)}. Even in the presence of refinancing possi-
bilities (which we introduce in Sections 3 and 4), we restrict ourselves to non–negative dividends
and model contributions separately. As a consequence, any required additional funding must
be either external or provided by the shareholders. The dynamics of the firm’s cash reserves
are described by the SDE
dRa,L(t) = a(t)(µdt+ σdW (t))− dL(t), Ra,L(0) = x.
Since, a priori, s0 needs not match x, an exceptional dividend being distributed at zero is
not excluded. Notice that we have assumed, for simplicity, that no interest is earned on cash
reserves1. The firm is shut down when its cash reserves run out, and we consider only the case
of a zero recovery rate. More specifically, the bankruptcy (stopping) time τ associated to a pair
(a, L) is defined as
τ := inf{t > 0 | Ra,L < 0}.
We have used a strict inequality in the definition of τ to allow, in the upcoming sections, for
reinvestment in the firm after its cash reserves hit zero. Let us denote by ρ the time–preference
rate of the investors. The expected, discounted dividend stream is given by the quantity
Ex
[ ∫ τ
0
e−ρtdL(t)
]
. (1)
Here Ex[·] is the expectation operator conditional on Ra,L(0) = x. Although a` priori the equity
holders are risk–neutral, the risk of bankruptcy implies that they will exhibit CRRA–preferences
for low levels of cash reserves. The stochastic control problem of choosing (a, L) as to maxi-
mize Expression (1) has been studied in [7]. We provide a brief summary in Appendix B for
completeness, and denote the corresponding value function by U(·). In the sequel we refer to
this setting as the basic model.
Below we introduce the requirement/possibility of refinancing (which may be viewed as costly
equity issuance) in the form of a cumulative contributions process {G(t)} (thus, we are mov-
ing away from self–financing strategies). The latter is also assumed to be non–decreasing and
ca`gla`d, and it wards off bankruptcy. The manager’s task is to devise a strategy
{
π(t) =(
a(t), L(t), G(t)
)}
in order to maximize the expected, discounted dividend stream net of contri-
butions. The way in which one models the cost of additional financing affects, unsurprisingly,
the manager’s decisions. In Section 3 we study the proportional–costs setting, whereas in
Section 4 we look at the case where there is a fixed cost associated to refinancing.
3. Proportional Costs of Refinancing
In this section we study the case where there are proportional costs associated to raising
additional cash for the firm. We consider a cost factor β ≥ 1, i.e. in order to inject x units of
cash into the firm, βx must be raised. Initially we assume the firm must be rescued whenever
cash reserves become negative, and that at no other time are additional funds injected. We
then show in Propositions 3.5 and 3.7 that this behavior is optimal.
1Otherwise the differential equation arising in the analysis of the value function cannot be solved explicitly.
This is the case in [15], but in our setting a non–stochastic short rate results in increased mathematical
complexity without adding much value in terms of the economic theory. Introducing a stochastic short rate,
however, results in PDEs whose solutions must be estimated numerically. This falls outside the scope of this
paper, but we refer the interested reader to [2], where some analysis in this direction is made.
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Given a strategy π = (a, L,G) and an initial cash level x, the corresponding cash–reserves
process evolves according to the SDE
dRπ(t) = dRa,L(t) + dG(t), Rπ(0) = x,
and the corresponding expected, discounted value of the firm (in terms of dividends net of
contributions) is
V π(x) = Ex
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(dL(t)− βdG(t))
]
.
We note that in the expression above, the integral’s upper limit has become ∞ as a result of
the mandatory refinancing strategy that we have imposed for the time being. We define the set
of admissible strategies to be
Πp :=
{
π = (a, L,G)
∣∣∣ (a(t), L(t), G(t)) ∈ F(t), F,G are non–decreasing and ca`gla`d andV π(x) ≥ 0
}
.
For a given cost factor β, the value function corresponding to the manager’s problem is
V β(x) := sup
π∈Πp
V π(x). (2)
The results in the related literature suggest that Vβ(x) should be a concave, increasing function,
and its first derivative of should be greater or equal than one. This reflects the marginal
impact that an additional unit of cash reserves has on the firm’s value, and the (possible)
decreasing returns to scale. As it is usually done in the optimal control literature, where second–
order smoothness of the value function is associated to optimality, we focus on candidate value
functions that are of class C2, in which case we have the following
Proposition 3.1. Assume the value function defined in Equation (2) is concave and twice
continuously differentiable. Then the following HJB equation holds in the strong sense:
max
{
max
a∈[0,1]
{1
2
σ2a2V
′′
β + µaV
′
β − ρV β
}
, 1− V ′β(x), V
′
β(x)− β
}
= 0. (3)
The Variational Inequality (3) provides necessary conditions for optimality. Furthermore, it
follows from Proposition 3.1 that, as long as refinancing only occurs when Rπ(t) = 0, the value
function satisfies the Neumann condition V
′
β(0) = β. Below we follow a strategy similar to that
in [15] and construct a candidate value function Vβ by initially dividing the domain into three
sections: [0, x0), [x0, x1) and [x1,∞). The solution to
max
a∈[0,1]
{1
2
σ2a2V ′′β + µaV
′
β − ρVβ
}
(4)
is assumed to be interior on (0, x0). On (x0, x1) we have a ≡ 1, whereas Vβ is affine on [x1,∞)
and on this domain V ′β ≡ 1. The economic intuition behind this partition is the following: On
(0, x0) the firm’s risk exposure is adjusted to decrease the probability of R
π becoming negative,
which is costly; on (x0, x1) the level of cash reserves is too large to require caution, hence the
firm is in “full–risk” mode, which is in expectation the most profitable one; level x1 is the
dividend barrier, and all cash beyond this point is instantly distributed to the equity holders.
Since V ′β ≡ 1 in this region, cash in the firm is worth the same to the shareholders as any
dividends would be. As it turns out, only at date t = 0 could the cash level be strictly greater
than x1. In this case there would be a lump sum of size x−x1 distributed at t = 0. Afterwards,
an optimal dividend/revinvestment regime will keep the cash reserves restricted to [0, x1].
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It should be stressed that, although our initial analysis takes the boundary points x0 and x1
as given, they will later be chosen as to have a C2 candidate for the value function. It might
occur, however, that for values of β in a small enough neighborhood of one (the radius of such
neighborhood depends on µ, σ and ρ), the variable–exposure region disappears. This obeys the
fact that very cheap re–financing results in a manger who needs not exercise much caution. We
make precise how this situations arises in the following section.
3.1. The full–investment region and the dividend barrier. On (x0, x1), and as long
as 1 < V ′β < β (which we verify a posteriori), the candidate value function Vβ satisfies the
second–order, linear ODE
1
2
σ2V ′′β + µV
′
β − ρVβ = 0,
whose general solution is
Vβ(x) = b1e
r1x + b2e
r2x, where ri :=
−µ+ (−1)i
√
µ2 + 2σ2ρ
σ2
. (5)
For each x1 > 0 we define Vx1 as the particular solution to Equation (5) that satisfies V
′
x1(x1) = 1
and V ′′x1(x1) = 0. It is not complicated to show that
Vx1(x) =
1
r1r2
( r22
r2 − r1 e
r1(x−x1) − r
2
1
r2 − r1 e
r2(x−x1)
)
. (6)
To show that the mapping x 7→ V ′x1(x) is decreasing for x < x1, we compute
V ′′x1(x) =
r1r2
r2 − r1
(
er1(x−x1) − er2(x−x1)
)
.
Observe that (r1r2)/(r2 − r1) is negative, so V ′′x1(x) is negative whenever er1(x−x1) − er2(x−x1)
is positive. The latter is equivalent to (r1 − r2)(x− x1) > 0 and, since r1 − r2 is negative, it is
also equivalent to x < x1. In Section 3.3 x1 is chosen so that Vβ is of class C2, and the condition
V ′x1 < β is satisfied. On [x1,∞) the value function has constant derivative equal to one. Since
Vx1(x1) =
r2+r1
r1r2
= µρ , we have by continuity that
Vβ(x) = (x− x1) + µ
ρ
, x > x1.
3.2. The variable exposure region. Whenever the firm’s level of cash reserves x ∈ (0, x0),
the manager will choose a risk exposure that depends on x. This is done by solving the problem
max
a∈[0,1]
{1
2
σ2a2V ′′β + µaV
′
β − ρVβ
}
,
whose maximizer is interior in this region. The first–order conditions on a are sufficient for
optimality, and they yield
a(x) = − µ
σ2
V ′β(x)
V ′′β (x)
. (7)
This in turn transforms Equation (4) into − µ22σ2
[V ′β(x)]
2
V ′′
β
(x) = ρVβ(x), which has general solution
Vβ(x) = c1
(
x
ρ
γ
+ c2
)γ
, where γ :=
2σ2ρ
µ2 + 2σ2ρ
.
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The boundary condition V ′β(0) = β implies c1 = (β/ρ)c
1−γ
2 . For each c > 0 we define
Vc(x) :=
β
ρ
c1−γ
(
x
ρ
γ
+ c
)γ
. (8)
In particular, we have that Vc(0) = βc/ρ. Due to the fact that γ < 1, Vc is a concave function
for all c > 0. If we insert Equation (8) into Equation (7) we obtain
a(x) =
µ
σ2
x
1− γ +
2
µ
c. (9)
Remark 3.2. Unless c = 0 in Equation (9), the firm’s risk exposure is not zero when x =
0. This obeys the fact that a diminished exposure is not the only tool available to ward off
bankruptcy, but additional cash injection may (and will be) used. The amount
α(x) :=
µ
σ2
x
1− γ
corresponds to the variable–exposure strategy in the basic model presented in Section 2, where
no additional contributions are possible (see Appendix B). In such case the firm’s size becomes
infinitesimal as x approaches zero, preventing it from hitting the bankruptcy barrier; technically
speaking, the optimal strategy implies that the dynamics of the firm’s cash reserves follow a
reflected geometric Brownian motion. Since a(x) ≥ α(x) (and in fact strictly greater if c > 0),
we may conclude that risk exposure is larger over the variable–exposure region whenever cash
re–injection is required to refinance the firm whenever the cash reserves hit zero.
The mapping x 7→ a(x) is strictly increasing, hence, to find x0 we solve the equation a(x) = 1,
which yields
x0 = x0(c) =
σ2(1− γ)
µ
− γ
ρ
c. (10)
Unlike in [7] and [15], in our model x0 is not uniquely defined by the boundary condition at
zero. The variable c will be chosen together with x1 as to guarantee the required regularity of
Vβ . If as a result of this process, and for µ, σ and ρ given, it is the case that c = c(β) satisfies
σ2(1− γ)
µ
− γ
ρ
c(β) < 0⇔ µ
2
< c(β),
then the partial–exposure regime disappears.
3.3. Characterizing the optimal strategy. We are seeking a solution of class C2 to Equa-
tion (3). The arguments in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 imply that, as long as x0(c) > 0, the structure
of the candidate value function Vβ is the following:
Vβ(x) =


Vc(x), x ∈ [0, x0(c));
Vx1(x), x ∈ [x0(c), x1);
(x− x1) + Vx1(x1), x ∈ [x1,∞).
(11)
The smooth–pasting conditions require us to find c∗ and x∗1 that solve the constrained, non–
linear system of equations
Vc∗(x0(c
∗)) = Vx∗1 (x0(c
∗)), V ′c∗(x0(c
∗)) = V ′x∗1 (x0(c
∗)), c∗, x∗1 ≥ 0. (12)
Although in general such a system needs not have a (unique) solution, an issue we shall en-
counter in Section 4, such is not the case for System (12). The following theorem is one of the
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main result in this section, and its proof allows us to draw several conclusions regarding the
effects of the cost factor on the manager’s decisions.
Theorem 3.3. For any triple (µ, σ, ρ) > 0 and any β > 1 System (12) has a unique solution.
If for a triple (µ, σ, ρ) > 0 and β > 1 the solution to System (12) yields x0(β) := x0(c
∗(β)) < 0,
then Vβ is characterized via
Vβ(x) =
{
Vx∗1 (x), x ∈ [0, x∗1);
(x− x∗1) + Vx∗1 (x∗1), x ∈ [x1,∞),
where x∗1 solves
r2e
−r1x
∗
1 − r1e−r1x
∗
1 = (r2 − r1)β. (13)
The mapping x1 7→ r2e−r1x1 − r1e−r1x1 is strictly increasing for x1 > 0, and it attains the value
r2 − r1 for x1 = 0; therefore, Equation (13) has a unique positive solution for β > 1. Notice
that in this case Vx∗1 (0) > 0, which follows from the fact that r
2
2e
−r1x
∗
1 < r21e
−r2x
∗
1 .
In the analysis below we let µ, σ and ρ be fixed and discuss the impact of a varying β. An
increasing level of β should depress the corresponding value function. In particular one would
expect Vβ(0), which equals βc(β)/ρ, to be decreasing in β. The latter would require that c(β)
tends to 0 as β tends to ∞, which would also affect the value of the lower boundary of the
full–exposure region. Namely, x0(β) would converge to σ
2(1−γ)/µ and a(x) would converge to
α(x) as c goes to 0. This quantities are precisely the boundary of the variable and full–exposure
regions in the basic model, as well as the corresponding level of exposure in the variable–
exposure region. At the limit there should in fact be no additional contributions, given that
their marginal cost becomes infinite. In this case we would have a “limit value function” that
satisfies V∞(0) = 0 and V
′
∞(0) = ∞, and for which the boundary of the variable–investment
region, as well as the level of investment, coincides with the values in the basic model. We prove
in Proposition 3.5 that the value function U(·) bounds Vβ(·) from below, and that ‖U − Vβ‖∞
converges to 0 as β goes to ∞. On the other hand, as β tends to 1 the value function Vβ(·)
becomes less concave, which is reflected by an increasing value of c(β). Eventually c(β) becomes
larger than µ/2 for β < 1, and the variable–exposure region vanishes. At the limit the value
function Vβ(x) becomes linear. The limiting function is
W (x) := x+
µ
ρ
,
which corresponds to the case where an exceptional dividend of size x is distributed at time
zero, and the future value of the firm corresponds to the discounted average profitability of the
fully–exposed strategy. We present in Figure 1 the plots of the value functions corresponding
to the parameters µ = 1.3, ρ = 1.2, σ = 1 and different values of β. For this particular example,
x0 becomes zero for β ≈ 1.25093.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 also yields the following
Corollary 3.4. For (µ, σ, ρ) > 0 fixed, there exists strictly positive constants A5(µ, σ, ρ) and
A6(µ, σ, ρ) such that β parameterizes c in the following way: c(β) = A5(µ, σ, ρ)β
1/(γ−1). If
c(β) < µ/2 then it holds that x1(β) = x0(β) +A6(µ, σ, ρ) and the exposure strategy is given by
aβ(x) :=
µ
σ2
x
1− γ +
2
µ
c(β).
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Figure 1. Comparing different Vβ ’s with µ = 1.3, ρ = 1.2, σ = 1.
Furthermore
Vc(β)(x0(β)) = Vx1(β)(x0(β)) = A5(µ, σ, ρ)
1−γ 1
ρ
(µ
2
)γ
and
V ′c(β)(x0(β)) = V
′
x1(β)
(x0(β)) = A5(µ, σ, ρ)
1−γ
(µ
2
)γ−1
are independent of β.
Corollary 3.4 confirms our intuition that both c(β) and Vβ(0) = ρ
−1A5β
γ/(γ−1) tend to zero as
β tends to infinity. Moreover, A6(µ, σ, ρ) coincides with x1 − x0 in the no–reinvestment case,
which implies that the presence of the re–investment opportunity shifts the full–exposure region
to the left. This leads us to the following
Proposition 3.5. Let (µ, σ, ρ) > 0 be given. Then
(i) U(x) < Vβ(x) for all x ≥ 0 and β < 1 and limβ→∞ ‖U − Vβ‖∞ = 0.
(ii) Vβ(x) < W (x) for all x ≥ 0 and β < 1 and limβ→1 ‖W − Vβ‖∞ = 0.
As a consequence of Proposition 3.5 we have that removing the restriction of mandatory rein-
vestment would not alter the manager’s decisions. In other words, regardless of how high the
marginal cost of reinvestment is, the shareholders’ interests are best served by choosing such
option. As long as c(β) < µ/2, the value at which the risk exposure changes from partial to
full is independent of β, since Vc(β)
(
x0(β)
)
and V ′c(β)
(
x0(β)
)
are constant. The level of cash
reserves at which this switch occurs, though, becomes smaller with β. Furthermore, the value
at which dividends are distributed is also independent of β.
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3.4. A verification result and implementation of the optimal strategies. For given
parameters β, µ, σ, and ρ, if we insert c(β) and x1(β) obtained in Corollary 3.4 into the function
defined in Expression (11) we obtain a candidate solution Vβ to Equation (2). In this section
we provide a verification result, and make the processes L(t) and G(t) explicit.
The Neumann conditions at x = 0 and x = x1(β) suggest that a localization strategy will be
optimal. Let us consider a Skorohod problem on [0, x1(β)] defined as follows: For a(x) defined
in Equation (9) let the processes (R∗, L∗, G∗) be a solution to
R∗(t) = x+
∫ t
0
µa(R∗(s))ds+
∫ t
0
σa(R∗(s))dW (s)− L∗(t) +G∗(t), (14)
0 ≤ R∗(t) ≤ x1(β), t ≥ 0, (15)∫ ∞
0
1{R∗(t)<x1(β)}dL
∗(t) =
∫ ∞
0
1{R∗(t)>0}dG
∗(t) = 0, (16)
where 1{·} is the zero–one indicator function. A comprehensive treatise on such reflection
problems can be found in [3] and [11]. The processes L∗(t) and G∗(t) are the local times of
R∗(t) at levels x1(β) and 0 respectively (See [14] for a thorough exposition of Brownian local
times). Their effect on the dynamics of R∗(t) is to reflect the latter in order to constrain it to
[0, x1(β)]. From Equation (16) we see that the mass of the measures dL
∗(t) and dG∗(t) is carried
respectively by the sets {R∗(t) = x1(β)} and {R∗(t) = 0}, thus L∗(t) and G∗(t) are inactive
whenever R∗(t) ∈ (0, x1(β)). We prove in Theorem 3.6 that the strategy π∗ := (a∗, L∗, G∗),
with a∗(t) := a(R∗(t)) solves the investor’s problem in Expression (2).
Notice that, by construction, Vβ is of class C2 and it satisfies the HJB Equation (3). We prove
that Vβ is the value function defined in Expression (2) in the following
Theorem 3.6. Let β ∈ [1,∞) and µ, σ, ρ > 0. Let c(β) and x1(β) be as in Corollary 3.4 and
Vβ the corresponding candidate value function. Let a
∗(x) = aβ(x) and π
∗ = (a∗, L∗, G∗), then
for all x ≥ 0
V β(x) = Vβ(x) = V
π∗(x).
We have seen that, for any β greater than one and conditional on cash re–injection being only
possible at level x = 0, costly refinancing is always a dominant strategy. To finalize this section
we show that the constraint on the re–injection level is moot, since refinancing at any other
level is suboptimal.
Proposition 3.7. Let β ∈ [1,∞) and µ, σ, ρ > 0. Let x > 0 and consider xˆ ∈ (0, x). Denote
by Vˆβ(x) the function defined in Expression (2) when re–investment has to be made at level xˆ.
Then for all x ≥ xˆ it holds that Vˆβ(x) < Vβ(x).
We have that, in fact, for x ∈ [xˆ,∞), Vˆβ(x) = Vβ(x − xˆ), thus Vˆ ′β(xˆ) = β and the constraint
Vˆ ′β ≥ β implies that the only possible continuous continuation of Vˆβ to [0, xˆ) is an affine one,
i.e.
Vˆβ(x) = β(x− xˆ) + A5
ρ
βγ/(γ−1),
where (A5/ρ)β
γ/(γ−1) = Vˆβ(xˆ) (see the proof of Proposition 3.7). This produces a non–C2
pasting at xˆ. The situation x < xˆ can therefore only occur at date t = 0, when an excep-
tional, lumpy re–injection of cash of amount xˆ − x would be required. The latter as long as
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(A5/ρ)β
γ/(γ−1) > xˆ, since otherwise the firm would have a negative NPV. In other words, if
re–injection at level xˆ were imposed on the firm, the firm would only be initiated for small
values of xˆ and/or β.
4. Fixed Costs of Refinancing
In this section we assume there is a non–negative, fixed cost of reinvestment, which we denote
by κ. In other words, to re–inject x units of cash into the firm, the shareholders must supply
x+ κ. We prove that, among strategies that require cash re–injection, doing so at level zero is
dominant. The latter suggests, within our stationary context, that there should be a strictly
positive level xˆ of funds to be contributed, should the manager chose to do so, if the cash
reserves reach zero. Naturally, if κ were too high, cash re–injection would be unfeasible. As a
consequence, and in contrast with Section 3, we do not initially assume bankruptcy is always
avoided. Notice that a lumpy refinancing strategy will result in a cash–reserves process that is
no longer reflected at level zero. Instead, the process will exhibit jumps of magnitude xˆ at the
bankruptcy level. This discontinuous behavior of the state and control variables situates the
results contained in this section within the impulse control literature (see, for example [10]).
4.1. The (possible) contributions’ structure and the value function. We start by
proving that it is optimal to postpone any re–injection of cash until the level x = 0 has been
reached. Due to the presence of the strictly positive fixed cost κ, it would be unfeasible for
refinancing to take place outside a discrete set of points. Otherwise, costs would become
infinite in finite time. Accordingly, we use the following notion of admissibility for an exposure–
dividends–refinancing triple:
Definition 4.1. Let {τi}∞i=1 be a sequence of strictly increasing
{Ft}t≥0–stopping times. Let
{xi}∞i=1 be a sequence of non–negative random variables such that ui ∈ Fτi . Define
J(t) :=
∞∑
i=1
xi1{t≥τi} and Jκ(t) :=
∞∑
i=1
(xi + κ)1{t≥τi}.
Further, let L(t) and a(t) be a cumulative consumption process and an exposure strategy, respec-
tively. For a given initial level of cash reserves x, we say that the triple (a, L, J) is admissible
if the following conditions hold:
(1) The process R(t), whose dynamics are given by
dR(t) = a(t)(µdt+ σdW (t))− dL(t) + dJ(t), R(0) = x
is a.s. non–negative.
(2) The value of the firm is non–negative, i.e.
V (x) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(dL(t)− dJκ(t))
]
≥ 0.
Consider now an initial level of cash reserves x, an admissible triple (a, L, J) and the corre-
sponding value V (x). We may assume without loss of generality that R(τ1) > 0. Let us define
the auxiliary processes
J˜(t) :=
∞∑
i=2
xi1{t≥τi}
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and the corresponding R˜(t), together with the stopping time τ := inf{t > 0 | R˜(t) ≤ 0}. By
construction τ > τ1. If we define J(t) := J˜(t) + x11{t≥τ} we have that the triple (a, L, J) is
admissible and the corresponding value U(x) satisfies U(x) > V (x). This last assertion follows
from the facts that −e−ρτ (x1 + κ) < e−ρτ1(x1 + κ), and that for any t ≥ τ2 it holds that
R(t) = R˜(t). It is then optimal to postpone the first time of issuance to the first time the
cash–reserves process hits zero, and an inductive argument implies that such is the case for all
re–injection times. Furthermore, the stationarity of our model also implies that there exists
xˆ ≥ 0 such that xi ≡ xˆ for all i ≥ 1.
We are now in a position to define the family of stopping times when cash could be re–injected
into the firm. For a given exposure–consumption pair (a, L) and initial cash reserves x, let us
define the sequence
{
λi
}
as follows:
λ1 := inf
{
t > 0
∣∣∣Ra,L1 (t) ≤ 0
}
, where Ra,L
1
solves dRa,L
1
(t) = a(t)(µdt+σdW (t))−dL(t), Ra,L
1
(0) = x;
for i > 1 we define λi := inf
{
t > λi−1
∣∣∣Ra,Li (t) ≤ 0}, where Ra,Li solves
dRa,Li (t) = a(t)(µdt+ σdW (t))− dL(t), Ra,Li (λi−1) = xˆ.
Let {J(t)} be the (jump) process defined via
J(t) =
{
0, t ∈ [0, λ1);
i− 1, x ∈ [λi−1, λi). (17)
Then the cumulative reinvestment process corresponding to a re–injection level xˆ and cost κ is
G(t) = (xˆ + κ)J(t). If the manager chooses the triple π = (a, L, xˆ), then the dynamics of the
cash–reserves process are
dRπ(t) = a(t)(µdt+ σdW (t))− dL(t) + xˆdJ(t), Rπ(0) = x.
The corresponding value of the firm is
V π(x) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(dL(t)− dG(t))
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(dL(t)− (xˆ+ κ)dJ(t))
]
.
An increase in xˆ increases the probability that consumption takes place, but it also costly. We
redefine the set of admissible strategies to be
Πf :=
{
π = (a, L, xˆ)
∣∣∣ (a(t), L(t)) ∈ F(t), L is non–decreasing and ca`dla`g, xˆ ≥ 0 and V π(x) ≥ 0
}
.
As before, the manager’s objective is to find
V κ(x) := sup
π∈Πf
V π(x). (18)
Proposition 4.2. Assume the value function defined in Equation (18) is twice continuously
differentiable. Let κ ≥ 0 be the fixed cost of reinvestment. Then the following HJB equation
holds in the strong sense:
max
{
max
a∈[0,1]
{1
2
σ2a2V
′′
κ + µaV
′
κ − ρV κ
}
, 1− V ′κ(x), H(x, V κ)− V κ(x)
}
= 0, (19)
where
H(x, φ) := sup
u≥0
{
φ(x+ u)− u− κ}.
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Observe that Proposition 4.2 implies the boundary condition at x = 0 must also be determined
endogenously. Namely, any candidate value function Vκ must satisfy the non–local boundary
condition Vκ(0) = H(0, Vκ). If we compute the first–order conditions for supu≥0
{
Vκ(0 + u) −
u − κ}, we obtain that u must satisfy V ′κ(u) = 1. This suggest that we will again have a two–
regimes setting of partial and full exposure, and distribution of dividends will occur only when
V ′κ(x) = 1. We shall again denote this optimal level of cash reserves by x1. Given that we now
face fixed refinancing costs, the condition V ′κ(u) = 1 confirms the intuition that if refinancing
is required, then x1 should be the optimal level of new contributions. This, naturally, as long
as it it not the case that too–high fixed costs make refinancing unprofitable. In other words, to
allow for strategic default the boundary condition should be rewritten as
Vκ(0) = max
{
Vκ(x1)− x1 − κ, 0
}
.
Below we follow a similar strategy as in Section 3 and analyze the investor’s decisions on the
regions (0, x0) and (x0, x1) to construct a candidate value function Vκ.
4.2. The investment regions and the distribution barrier. There are two main depar-
tures, in terms of the differential equations, between the fixed and the proportional–costs cases.
The first one corresponds to the boundary condition at x = 0. The second one to the determi-
nation of the (free) boundary that separates the variable and full–exposure regions. Bellow we
analyze the impact of a varying level of κ for fixed µ, ρ and σ. In the case of the full–exposure
region (x0, x1), the results of Section 3.1 still apply, thus any candidate value function has the
following form:
Vx1(x) =
1
r1r2
( r22
r2 − r1 e
r1(x−x1) − r
2
1
r2 − r1 e
r2(x−x1)
)
.
For x > x1 the candidate value function is again an affine function of the cash–reserves level x :
Vκ(x) = (x− x1) + r2 + r1
r1r2
= (x− x1) + µ
ρ
.
Borrowing from Section 3.2, we have that on (0, x0) the candidate value function is of the form
Vκ(x) = c1
(
x
ρ
γ
+ c2
)γ
,
where again γ = ρ/
(
µ2
2σ2 +ρ
)
. Assume that for x1 given, V (x1)−x1−κ > 0. Then the boundary
condition V (0) = V (x1)− x1 − κ implies
c2 =
( 1
c1
[µ
ρ
− x1 − κ
])1/γ
.
For each c > 0 we have
Vc,x1(x) := c
(
x
ρ
γ
+ s(c, x1)
)γ
, where s(c, x1) :=
(1
c
[µ
ρ
− x1 − κ
])1/γ
. (20)
On the variable risk exposure region (0, x0), the equation a(x) = − µσ2 V
′
κ(x)
V ′′κ (x)
still holds, which
together with Equation (20) yields
a(x) =
2
µ
(
x
ρ
γ
+ s(c, x1)
)
. (21)
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Once again we determine x0 as the solution to the equation a(x) = 1, which in this case results
in
x0 = x0(c, x1) =
γ
ρ
(µ
2
− s(c, x1)
)
=
σ2(1− γ)
µ
− γ
ρ
s(c, x1). (22)
The condition that guarantees a non–void partial–exposure region is s(c, x1) < µ/2.
Proposition 4.3. Let c∗(κ) and x∗1(κ) be parameters that yield a C2 candidate value function.
There exists a threshold κ > 0 (which depends on µ, σ and ρ) such that s(c(κ), x1(κ)) > µ/2
for κ < κ.
If it were the case that κ < κ, then the manager’s problem would reduce to deciding when to
distribute dividends. The dividend barrier x∗1(κ) solves the equation
1
r1r2
( r22
r2 − r1 e
−r1x
∗
1(κ) − r
2
1
r2 − r1 e
−r2x
∗
1(κ)
)
=
µ
ρ
− x∗1(κ)− κ. (23)
The following lemma follows from Proposition 4.3 and Equation (23)
Lemma 4.4. For any µ, ρ and σ, it holds that limκ→0 x
∗
1(κ) = 0.
In particular, if κ = 0 then x1 = 0 solves Equation (23). In other words, costless reinvestment
results in the first–best solution, i.e. Vκ(x) =W (x), which coincides with the proportional–cost
case when β = 1.
Remark 4.5. In contrast with the proportional–costs scenario, here x1−x0 will not be constant.
However, we are still able to express x0(c, x1) as the difference between the x0 of the basic model
and the non–negative term γρ s(c, x1). Therefore, the firm enters the full–exposure regime earlier
(or at least not later) with the option of refinancing subject to a fixed–cost. Furthermore, this
non–constant size of the full–exposure region implies that, in general, for µ, σ and ρ given it is
not possible to find β > 1 and κ > 0 such that Vβ(x) = Vκ(x) for all x ≥ 0.
Let us revisit the condition Vκ(0) = max
{
Vκ(x1)−x1−κ, 0
}
= max
{
µ
ρ −x1−κ, 0
}
. If κ > µ/ρ
then the cost of refinancing, relative to the firm’s discounted, expected cashflows, would be too
high. As a consequence V (0) = 0 and we would find ourselves back in the basic model. The
condition κ < µ/ρ is necessary, but not sufficient, for refinancing to be profitable. Below we
analyze the effects that different levels of κ have have on the boundary conditions.
4.3. Characterizing the optimal strategy. We seek smooth pasting of the candidate value
function V˜κ(x), which is defined, for a given 0 < κ < κ, as:
Vκ(x) :=


Vc∗,x∗1 (x), x ∈ [0, x0(c∗, x∗1));
Vx∗1 (x), x ∈ [x0(c∗, x∗1), x∗1);
(x− x∗1) + µ/ρ, x ∈ [x∗1,∞),
(24)
where c∗ and x∗1 solve the constrained, non–linear system of equations
Vc∗,x∗1 (x0(c
∗, x∗1)) = Vx∗1 (x0(c
∗, x∗1)), V
′
c∗,x∗1
(x0(c
∗)) = V ′x∗1 (x0(c
∗, x∗1)),
0 ≤ x∗1 ≤
µ
ρ
− κ; c∗ ≥ 0. (25)
We present necessary conditions for optimality of Vκ in the following
Proposition 4.6. Let (µ, σ, ρ) > 0, set A :=
√
µ2 + 2σ2ρ and assume 0 < κ < µ/ρ. Any
solution to System (25) satisfies
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(a) κ = 0.1 (b) κ ≈ 0.028
• c∗ = 2
A
√−r1r2
(
− r2
r1
)− µ2A(µ
2
)1−γ
.
• The value of x∗1 = x∗1(κ) is implicitly determined by the expression
γ
ρ
s(c∗, x∗1) = B4(µ, σ, ρ)− x∗1, (26)
where B4(µ, σ, ρ) := − σ
2
2A
log
(
− r2
r1
)
+
γµ
2ρ
.
Observe that the value of c∗ does not depend on κ. Equation (26) provides us with the precise
value κ of the fixed cost for which the manager is indifferent between refinancing or not. This
occurs when the graphs of the mappings x 7→ s(c∗, x) and x 7→ B4(µ, σ, ρ) − x intersect at
x = B4(µ, σ, ρ). In other words, κ is such that s(c
∗, B4) = 0 :
κ =
µ
ρ
(
1− γ
2
)
+
σ2
2A
log
(
− r2
r1
)
.
For κ = κ the value of x that satisfies s(c∗, x) = µ/2, and therefore determines whether the
partial–exposure region is void or not, is
x(κ) = x(κ) = B4(µ, σ, ρ)− c∗
(µ
2
)γ
< x∗1(κ).
In fact, x(κ) and x∗1(κ) coincide with x0 and x1 in the basic model. As κ becomes smaller than
κ, x∗1(κ) becomes smaller than B4(µ, σ, ρ). On the contrary, x(κ) grows as κ decreases. As long
κ ∈ (κ, κ), i.e. if x0(c∗, x∗1) > 0 the variable–exposure regime is given by
aκ(x) :=
2
µ
(
x
ρ
γ
+ s(c∗, x∗1(κ))
)
.
Eventually κ = κ and then x(κ) = x∗1(κ). For any smaller fixed–cost of reinvestment, the
variable–exposure region vanishes and x∗1(κ) is determined by solving Equation (23). In other
words, if κ ≤ κ then aκ(x) ≡ 1. We illustrate the above description in Figure 4.3, where we
have set µ = σ = 0.2 and ρ = 0.1.
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4.4. Implementation of the optimal strategies. Equation (24) yields a candidate value
function whenever 0 < κ < κ. Associated to such candidate we have the following choice of
contributions/dividents strategies: Let {L∗} be the local time at level x∗1(κ) of the process X
corresponding to the strong solution to
dX(t) = a∗(t)(µdt+ σdW (t)), X(0) = x.
As in Section 3, the continuous process {L∗} represents the cumulative dividends. From the
arguments in Section 4.1 it follows that the only possibly optimal choice for the cumulative
contributions process G is given by
G∗(t) = (x∗1(κ) + κ)J
∗(t),
where the pure–jump process {J∗} is as defined in Equation (17) and the hitting times {λi}
are determined by the processes
{
Ra
∗,L∗
i
}
. We define π∗ :=
(
aκ, L
∗, x∗1(κ)
)
and must now show
that Vκ(x) = V
π∗(x) coincides with the value function, which we prove in the following
Theorem 4.7. Let κ > 0 and µ, σ, ρ > 0. Let c∗ and x1(κ) be as in Proposition4.6 and let Vκ
be the corresponding candidate value function. Let π∗ be as defined above. Then for all x ≥ 0
V κ(x) = Vκ(x) = V
π∗(x).
5. Conclusions
We have employed Singular Stochastic Control and Impulse Control techniques to extend the
models presented in [7], [4] and [12]. In a setting where a firm’s manager continuously adjusts
the firm’s exposure to a risky production technology, we have studied the impact that costly re–
investment possibilities have on the manager’s optimal behavior. We have obtained expressions
that characterize, and in the proportional–costs case analytically describe, the partial and full
exposure regions, as well as the consumption boundary. This has allowed us to provide detailed
descriptions of the value functions as re–investment costs vary, such as conditions that lead
to the disappearance of the partial exposure region for low cost levels. Furthermore, these
expressions provide a clear picture of the quantitative difference between proportional– and
fixed–costs models. He have left for future research the interesting scenario that includes a
stochastic short rate, an which wold require, in our opinion, a variable investment level in the
risky technology in nominal terms.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Within this proof, since there is no risk of confusion, we drop the
subindex β. We first consider the conditions on V ′. By definition, for any h, y > 0 there exists a
strategy πy such that V
πy (y) ≥ V (y)−h2. Let 0 < h < x and construct a strategy π by setting
Lπt = h+ L
πx−h
t , G
π
t = G
πx−h
t and a
π(t) = aπx−h(t). Then
V (x) ≥ V π(x) = h+ V πx−h(x− h) ≥ h+ V (x− h)− h2,
which is equivalent to
V (x)− V (x− h)
h
≥ 1− h.
By the differentiability of V, we may let h go to zero and conclude that V ′(x) ≥ 1. Now set
Gπt = h+ L
πx+h
t , L
π
t = L
πx+h
t and a
π(t) = aπx+h(t). Then
V (x) ≥ V π(x) = V πx+h(x+ h)− βh ≥ V (x+ h)− βh− h2,
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therefore
V (x+ h)− V (x)
h
≤ β + h.
The above implies that V ′(x) ≤ β. Next, fix a strategy π ∈ Πp with corresponding cash–reserves
process Rπ(t) (Rπ(0) = x) and apply Itoˆ’s formula to f(t, x) = e−ρtV (x) :
e−ρtV (Rπ(t)) = V (x) +
∫ t
0
e−ρs
(
µa(s)V ′(Rπ(s))− ρV (Rπ(s)))ds
+
∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′′(Rπ(s))d[Rπ, Rπ](s)
+
∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′(Rπ(s))dW (s)−
∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′(Rπ(s))
(
dL(s)− dG(s))
+
∑
s∈Γ1∪Γ2
e−ρs
(
V (Rπ(s))− V (Rπ(s−))− V ′(Rπ(s))(Rπ(s)−Rπ(s−))
)
,
(27)
where Γ1 is the set of discontinuities of L and Γ2 of G. Since L and G are of bounded variation
we have that
d[Rπ, Rπ](s) =
σ2a2(s)
2
ds.
Thus, Equation (27) becomes
e−ρtV (Rπ(t)) = V (x) +
∫ t
0
e−ρsLa(V (Rπ(s)))ds
+
∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′(Rπ(s))dW (s)−
∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′(Rπ(s))
(
dL(s)− dG(s))
+
∑
s∈Γ1∪Γ2
e−ρs
(
V (Rπ(s))− V (Rπ(s−))− V ′(Rπ(s))(Rπ(s)−Rπ(s−))
)
,
(28)
where La is the infinitesimal generator of the diffusion part of Rπ. We now take expectations
on both sides. The bounds on V ′ imply that the Itoˆ integral vanishes and that
E
[
e−ρtV (Rπ(t))
] ≤ V (x)− E[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′(Rπ(s))
(
dL(s)− dG(s))].
Therefore
0 ≥ E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρs
(− ρV (Rπ(s)) + µaV ′(Rπ(s)) + 1
2
σ2a2V ′′(Rπ(s))
)
ds
]
+ E
[ ∑
s∈Γ1∪Γ2
e−ρs
(
V (Rπ(s))− V (Rπ(s−))− V ′(Rπ(s))(Rπ(s)−Rπ(s−))
)]
.
(29)
By the Mean Value Theorem there exists r∗ ∈ (Rπ(s−), Rπ(s)) such that
V (Rπ(s))− V (Rπ(s−)) = V ′(r∗)(Rπ(s)−Rπ(s−)).
Therefore
V (Rπ(s))−V (Rπ(s−))−V ′(Rπ(s))
(
Rπ(s)−Rπ(s−)
)
=
(
V ′(r∗)−V ′(Rπ(s)))(Rπ(s)−Rπ(s−))
18 ANDREA BARTH AND SANTIAGO MORENO–BROMBERG
and by concavity of V the second summand of the righthand side of Expression (29) is positive.
This yields
0 ≥ E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρs
(− ρV (Rπ(s)) + µaV ′(Rπ(s)) + 1
2
σ2a2V ′′(Rπ(s))
)
ds
]
.
Multiply both sides of the equation above times 1/t and take limit as t → 0. Since the choice
of a was arbitrary, this results in
0 ≥ max
a∈[0,1]
{1
2
σ2a2V ′′(x) + µaV ′(x)− ρV (x)
}
To prove that one of the inequalities is always tight, we resort to the dynamic programming
principle and write for t > 0
V (x) = max
π∈Πp
E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρs(dL(s)− βdG(s)) + e−ρtV (Rπ(t))
]
.
Inserting Equation (28) in the equation above we obtain
0 = max
π∈Πp
{
E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsLa(V (Rπ(s)))ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρs(1− V ′(Rπ(s)))dL(s) +
∫ t
0
e−ρs(V ′(Rπ(s))− β)dG(s)
]
+ E
[ ∑
s∈Γ1∪Γ2
e−ρs
(
∆V (Rπ(s))− V ′(Rπ(s))(∆Rπ(s)))]
}
.
(30)
If we write L˜ and G˜ for the continuous parts of L and G respectively, then the Equation (30)
above may be rewritten as
0 = max
π∈Πp
{
E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρsLa(V (Rπ(s)))ds
]
+ E
[ ∫ t
0
e−ρs(1− V ′(Rπ(s)))dL˜(s) +
∫ t
0
e−ρs(V ′(Rπ(s))− β)dG˜(s)
]
+ E
[ ∑
s∈Γ1
e−ρs
(
∆V (Rπ(s)) + ∆L(s)
)]
+ E
[ ∑
s∈Γ2
e−ρs
(
∆V (Rπ(s))− β∆G(s))]
}
.
Notice that for all s ∈ (0, t) it holds that
∆V (Rπ(s)) + ∆L(s) =
∫ Rpi(s−)
Rpi(s−)−∆L(s)
(1− V ′(x))dx ≤ 0
and
∆V (Rπ(s))− β∆G(s) =
∫ Rpi(s−)+∆G(s)
Rpi(s−)
(V ′(x)− β)dx ≤ 0.
This implies all summands on the right hand side of Equation (30) are non positive, which
concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Theorem 3.3. We have from Expression (10) that
Vc(x0) =
β
ρ
(µ
2
)γ
c1−γ
and
Vx1(x0) =
1
r1r2
( r22
r2 − r1 e
r1
(1−γ)σ2
µ e−r1(
γ
ρ
c+x1) − r
2
1
r2 − r1 e
r2
(1−γ)σ2
µ e−r2(
γ
ρ
c+x1)
)
.
Let us define
A1 :=
β
ρ
(µ
2
)γ
, A2 :=
r2
r1(r2 − r1)e
r1
(1−γ)σ2
µ and A3 :=
r1
r2(r2 − r1)e
r2
(1−γ)σ2
µ .
Then the expression
F1(c, x) := A1c
1−γ −A2e−r1(
γ
ρ
c+x) +A3e
−r2(
γ
ρ
c+x) = 0
corresponds to the pasting condition Vc(x0) = Vx1(x0). Notice that A3 < A2 < 0, which implies
that F1(0, 0) = A3 −A2 < 0. Next we have that
V ′c (x0) = β
(µ
2
)γ−1
c1−γ
and
V ′x1(x0) = r1A2e
−r1(
γ
ρ
c+x1) − r2A3e−r2(
γ
ρ
c+x1).
If we define A′1 := β
(
µ
2
)γ−1
, then the condition we require is
F2(c, x) := A
′
1c
1−γ − r1A2e−r1(
γ
ρ
c+x) + r2A3e
−r2(
γ
ρ
c+x) = 0.
Next we compute
F2(c, x)− r1F1(c, x) = (A′1 − r1A1)c1−γ + (r2 − r1)A3e−r2(
γ
ρ
c+x) = 0.
Solving for x in the expression above yields
x = −γ
ρ
c− 1
r2
log
(
Bc1−γ
)
, where B :=
A′1 − r1A1
(r1 − r2)A3 . (31)
Inserting Equation (31) into F1(c, x) yields
A1c
1−γ −A2
(
Bc1−γ
) r1
r2 +A3
(
Bc1−γ
)
= 0;
therefore
c =
(
A1 +BA3
A2Br1/r2
)r2/(1−γ)(r1−r2)
. (32)
Substituting A1, A2, A3 and B in Equation (31) we obtain
c(β) = β1/(γ−1)A5, where A5 :=
(
A˜1 + B˜A3
A2B˜r1/r2
)r2/(1−γ)(r1−r2)
, (33)
A˜i := β
−1Ai and B˜ := β
−1B. Since A2B˜
r1/r2 < 0, we must show that A˜1 + B˜A3 < 0 to have a
well–defined c(β). Observe that
A˜1 + B˜A3 = A˜1 +
A˜′1 − r1A˜1
r1 − r2 =
A˜′1 − r2A˜1
r1 − r2 .
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Since r1 − r2 < 0, c(β) is well–defined whenever A˜′1 − r2A˜1 > 0. After simplification, the latter
is equivalent to 2ρ > r2µ, which in turn may be rewritten as
2σ2ρ
µ
> −µ+
√
µ2 + 2σ2ρ. (34)
Simple arithmetics are required to show that Expression (34) is equivalent to µ <
√
µ2 + 2σ2ρ,
which holds for all µ, σ, ρ > 0. Inserting c(β) into Equation (31) we get
x = −γ
ρ
c(β)− 1
r2
log

(− r1
r2
) 2r2
r2−r1
e−r2
(1−γ)σ2
µ
[
A˜′1 − B˜A3
A˜′1 − r1A˜1
] r1
(r2−r1)

 .
Thus,
x1(β) = −γ
ρ
c(β)− 1
r2
log
(
e−r2
(1−γ)σ2
µ
)
− 1
r2
log

(− r1
r2
) 2r2
r2−r1
[
A˜′1 − B˜A3
A˜′1 − r1A˜1
] r1
(r2−r1)


=
σ2(1− γ)
µ
− γ
ρ
c(β)− 1
r2
log

(− r1
r2
) 2r2
r2−r1
[
A˜′1 − B˜A3
A˜′1 − r1A˜1
] r1
(r2−r1)


= x0(β) +A6,
(35)
where
A6 := − 1
r2
log

(− r1
r2
) 2r2
r2−r1
[
A˜′1 − B˜A3
A˜′1 − r1A˜1
] r1
(r2−r1)


It should be remarked that A6 coincides with x1 − x0 in the no–reinvestment case presented in
Appendix ??, thus c(β) and x1(β) are such that x0(β) ≤ x1(β).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3.4. The expressions for c(β) and x1(β) are given in Equations (33)
and (35) respectively. The result for Vc(β)(x0(β)) and V
′
c(β)(x0(β)) follows from the smooth
pasting condition and the fact that
c(β)1−γ = β−1A1−γ5 and
ρσ2(1− γ)
γµ
=
µ
2
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Let 1 ≤ β1 ≤ β2. Since γ ∈ (0, 1), then β12/(γ − 1) < β11/(γ − 1).
Hence, for x ∈ [0, x0(β1)] we have
Vc(β1)(x) =
1
ρ
A1−γ5
(ρ
γ
x+ β11/(γ − 1)A5
)
<
1
ρ
A1−γ5
(ρ
γ
x+ β12/(γ − 1)A5
)
= Vc(β2)(x).
From Equations (10) and (35) we have that
Vx1(β)(x) = α2e
−r1x0(β)er1x − α3e−r2x0(β)er2x,
where
α2 :=
r2
r1(r2 − r1)e
−r1A6 and α3 :=
r1
r2(r2 − r1)e
−r2A6 .
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Notice that for i = 1, 2 αi < 0, and recall that −r2 < 0 < −r1. Since x0(β1) < x0(β2) we have
α2e
−r1x0(β1) > α2e
−r1x0(β2) and − α3e−r2x0(β1) > −α3e−r2x0(β2).
Thus, for x ∈ [x0(β2), x1(β1)] we have Vx1(β1)(x) > Vx1(β2)(x). From Corollary 3.4 we have that
for x ∈ [x0(β1), x0(β2)] it hold that Vc(β2)(x) < Vx1(β1)(x), and for x ∈ [x1(β1), x1(β2)] we have
(x− x1(β1)) + r2+r1r1r2 > Vx1(β2)(x). We conclude that, for all x ≥ 0, Vβ1(x) > Vβ2(x).
Denote by x∗1 the limβ→∞ x1(β) and by x
∗
0 the limβ→∞ x0(β). These are, respectively, the
dividend and the full–investment barriers for U(·). We know from Equation (35) that this is
finite. For any ǫ > 0, the family {Vβ} restricted to the domain [ǫ, x1] is uniformly bounded.
Moreover, all the Vβ ’s are concave and their derivatives are uniformly bounded, hence {Vβ} is
also a uniformly equicontinuous family. By the Arzela`–Ascoli theorem there exits a uniform
limit, which we denote by V∞. We have from Equation (33) that
lim
β→∞
Vβ(0) = lim
β→∞
β
ρ
β1/(γ−1)A5 = 0.
Furthermore, the net {Vβ(0)} decreases monotonically with β, which allows us to conclude
that, even setting ǫ = 0, the family {Vβ} has V∞ as a limit. Since x1(β) → x∗1, we have from
Equation (6) that Vx1(β) → U as the domains of the Vx1(β)’s converges (in terms of inclusions)
to [x∗0, x
∗
1]. On [0, x
∗
0], V∞ is a radical function of exponent γ. V∞(0) = 0 and V∞(x
∗
0) =
A5(µ, σ, ρ)
1−γ 1
ρ
(
µ
2
)γ
. This coincides with the solution to the boundary–value problem that
generates U(x), and we may conclude that {Vβ} converges uniformly to U as β grows to infinity.
The proof that Vβ(x) converges uniformly to x+ ρ
−1A5 as β tends to one is analogous.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. Consider an arbitrary strategy π = (a, L,G) ∈ Πp, and an initial level
of cash reserves x ≥ 0. Recall that the corresponding cash–reserves process evolves according
to the SDE
dRπ(t) = a(t)(µdt+ σdW (t))− dL(t) + dG(t), Rπ(0) = x.
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 3.1 we use (the generalized) Itoˆ’s formula applied to
f(t, x) = e−ρtVβ(x) and obtain, after simplifications (recall that LaVβ(Rπ(t)) ≤ 0)
e−ρtE [Vβ(R
π(t))] ≤ Vβ(x)− E
[∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′β(R
π(s))
(
dL˜(s)− dG˜(s))]
+ E
[ ∑
s∈Γ1∪Γ2
e−ρs
(
Vβ(R
π(s))− Vβ(Rπ(s−))
)]
,
(36)
where
L˜(s) := L(s)− L(s−) and G˜(s) := G(s)−G(s−)
are the continuous parts of L and G respectively. If s ∈ Γ1 ∩ Γ2, then redefining L(s) :=
(L(s)−G(s))+ and G(s) := (G(s)− L(s))+ results in the same strategy with a jump only for
L or G. We may therefore assume without loss of generality that Γ1 and Γ2 are disjoint. Let
s ∈ Γ1, then by the Mean Value Theorem and the fact that 1 ≤ V ′β(Rπ(s)) ≤ β, there exists
r∗ ∈ (Rπ(s−), Rπ(s)) such that
Vβ(R
π(s))− Vβ(Rπ(s−)) = V ′β(r∗)
(
Rπ(s)−Rπ(s−)
) ≥ −(L(s)− L(s−)).
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Analogously, if s ∈ Γ2, we have
Vβ(R
π(s))− Vβ(Rπ(s−)) = V ′β(r∗)
(
Rπ(s)−Rπ(s−)
) ≥ β(G(s)−G(s−)).
Inserting the above expressions into Expression (36) we get
e−ρtE [Vβ(R
π(t))] ≤ Vβ(x)− E
[∫ t
0
e−ρs
(
dL(s)− βdG(s))] .
By continuity Vβ(x) is bounded for x ∈ [0, x1(β)] and it grows linearly as x tends to infinity,
therefore
lim
t→∞
e−ρtE [Vβ(R
π(t))] = 0.
This implies that
Vβ(x) ≥ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs
(
dL(s)− βdG(s))] . (37)
Next consider the strategy π∗ = (a∗, L∗, G∗). Since L∗ and G∗ are the local times of R∗ at
levels x1(β) and 0 respectively, we may assume that x ∈ [0, x1(β)]. Furthermore, L∗ and G∗ are
continuous processes, and on [0, x1(β)] it holds that La(Vβ(Rπ(s))) = 0. Hence, for the strategy
π∗ Itoˆ’s formula yields
e−ρtVβ(R
π(t)) = Vβ(x)+
∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′β(R
π(s))dW (s)−
∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′β(R
π(s))
(
dL∗(s)−dG∗(s)). (38)
The measure dL∗(s) is supported on {Rπ(s) = x1(β)} and V ′β(x1(β)) = 1. The measure dG∗(s)
is supported on {Rπ(s) = 0} and V ′β(0) = β, therefore, taking expectations, Equation (38) may
be rewritten as
e−ρtE [Vβ(R
π(t))] = Vβ(x)− E
[∫ t
0
e−ρs
(
dL(s)− βdG(s))] .
Letting t→∞ we have
Vβ(x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs
(
dL(s)− βdG(s))] . (39)
Form Equation (37) we have that for any π ∈ Πp, Vβ(x) ≥ V π(x). Since π∗ ∈ Πp Equation (39)
yields
Vβ(x) = sup
π∈Πp
V π(x),
which concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. We proceed along the lines of the proof of Theorem 3.3. Reflecting
at level x > 0 implies that V
′
β(x) = β. The latter yields, for x ∈ [x, x0],
V β(x) =
β
ρ
(
ρ
γ
x+ c(β)
)1−γ (
x
ρ
γ
+ c(β)
)γ
.
In this case we have
c(β) = β1/(γ−1)A5 − ρ
γ
x.
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In other words, switching from the reflection–at–zero regime to the reflection–at–x one reduces
c(β) by ργx, which in turn impacts the level of risk exposure in the following way:
a(x) = a(x)− 2ρ
γµ
x.
The smooth–pasting conditions then result in x0(β) = x0(β)+x and x1(β) = x1(β)+x. Notice
that
V β(x) = Vβ(0) =
A5
ρ
βγ/(γ−1);
V β(x0(β)) = Vβ(x0(β)) =
A1−γ5
ρ
(µ
2
)γ
βγ/(γ−1);
V β(x1(β)) = Vβ(x1(β)) =
µ
σ2ρ
.
In fact we have that, for x ∈ [x,∞), V β(x) = Vβ(x− x). This clearly shows that V β is strictly
dominated by Vβ whenever x ≥ x.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. In analogous fashion as in the proof of Proposition 3.1, we have
that
0 ≥ max
a∈[0,1]
{1
2
σ2a2V ′′ + µaV ′ − ρV
}
and 0 ≥ 1− V ′(x).
Given a reserves level x, the valueH(x, V ) = supu≥0
{
V (x+u)−u−κ} corresponds to executing
the best immediate action (in terms of cash injection) and behaving optimally after that. Since
there are states where it might not be optimal to exercise the option of refinancing, we have
V (x) ≥ H(x, V ), or 0 ≥ H(x, V ) − V (x). The fact that one of these three inequalities binds
follows from argument analogous to those found in the proof of Proposition 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. Inserting Expression (22) into Vc(x) we have that
Vc(x0) = c
(µ
2
)γ
and V ′c (x0) = cρ
(µ
2
)γ−1
.
Inserting Expression (22) into Vx1(x) yields
Vx1(x0) = B2e
−r1(
γ
ρ
s(c,x1)+x1) −B3e−r2(
γ
ρ
s(c,x1)+x1),
where
B2 :=
r2
r1(r2 − r1)e
r1
γµ
2ρ and B3 :=
r1
r2(r2 − r1)e
r2
γµ
2ρ .
Furthermore
V ′x1(x0) = r1B2e
−r1(
γ
ρ
s(c,x1)+x1) − r2B3e−r2(
γ
ρ
s(c,x1)+x1).
The smooth–pasting conditions result in system of equations on c and x. Proceeding as in the
proof of Theorem 3.3, we obtain that x is implicitly determined by the equation
x = − 1
r2
log
(
c
(µ
2
)γ−1(
ρ− r1µ/2
)/
(r1 − r2)B3
)
− γ
ρ
s(c, x). (40)
Inserting Expression (40) into the smoothness condition V ′c (x0)− V ′x(x0) = 0 yields
c
[(µ
2
)γ
−B3 r2
r1
(µ
2
)γ−1
(ρ− r1µ/2)e−r2
γµ2
σ2ρ
]
= B2
[
−r2
r1
c
(µ
2
)γ−1
(ρ− r1µ/2)e−r2
γµ2
σ2ρ
] r1
r2
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Factorizing c we obtain
c = 2
(
− r2
r1
) r2+r1
r2−r1
(µ
2
)1−γ [ (2ρ− r1µ)r1
(2ρ− r2µ)r2
] 1
r2−r1
.
Define A :=
√
µ2 + 2σ2ρ and observe that 2ρ− riµ = (−1)iriA, which gives
c =
2
A
(
− r2
r1
) r2+r1
r2−r1
(µ
2
)1−γ [−rr11
rr22
] 1
r2−r1
.
Next we write
−rr11
rr22
=
(−r1)−µ/σ2(−r1)−A/σ2
(r2)−µ/σ
2(r2)A/σ
2 =
(
− r1
r2
)−µ/σ2
(−r1r2)−A/σ
2
,
which together with the fact that r2 − r1 = 2A/σ2 implies
c =
2
A
(
− r2
r1
) r2+r1
r2−r1
(µ
2
)1−γ(
− r2
r1
)µ/2A
(−r1r2)1/2 = 2
A
√−r1r2
(
− r2
r1
)−µ/2A(µ
2
)1−γ
. (41)
Inserting Equation (41) into Equation (40) yields after simplification the required expression
for γρ s(c, x) + x.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Para paraphrasing the first part of the proof of Theorem 3.6, one
can show without much difficulty that for an arbitrary strategy π = (a, L, xˆ) ∈ Πf , an initial
level of cash reserves x ≥ 0 and a fixed–cost κ it holds that
Vκ(x) ≥ E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs
(
dL(s)− (xˆ+ κ)dJ(s))] , (42)
where the process {J} is as defined in Expression (17). Next consider the strategy π∗ =
(a∗κ, L
∗, x∗1(κ)). By construction we may assume that x ∈ [0, x∗1(κ)], a region in which it holds
that La(Vκ(Rπ(s))) = 0. Hence, for the strategy π∗ Itoˆ’s formula yields
e−ρtVκ(R
π(t)) = Vκ(x) +
∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′κ(R
π(s))dW (s)−
∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′κ(R
π(s))
(
dL˜(s)− x∗1(κ)dJ˜(s)
)
+
∑
s∈Γ
e−ρs
(
Vκ(R
π(s))− Vκ(Rπ(s−))
)
,
where Γ is the set of discontinuities of {Rπ} and L˜(s) and J˜(s) are the continuous parts of
the processes {L} and {J}. Since the former is itself continuous and the latter is a pure jump
process we may write
e−ρtVκ(R
π(t)) = Vκ(x) +
∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′κ(R
π(s))dW (s)−
∫ t
0
e−ρsV ′κ(R
π(s))dL(s)
+
∑
s∈Γ
e−ρs
(
Vκ(R
π(s))− Vκ(Rπ(s−))
)
.
(43)
The set Γ corresponds, in fact, to the crossings of level zero by {Rπ}. Therefore for s ∈ Γ we
have (from the non–local boundary condition at zero)
Vκ(R
π(s))− Vκ(Rπ(s−)) = Vκ(x∗1(κ))−
(
Vκ(x
∗
1(κ))− x∗1(κ)− κ
)
= x∗1(κ) + κ.
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The measure dL∗(s) is supported on {Rπ(s) = x1(β)} and V ′β(x1(β)) = 1. therefore, taking
expectations, Equation (43) becomes
e−ρtE [Vκ(R
π(t))] = Vκ(x)− E
[∫ t
0
e−ρs
(
dL∗(s)− (x∗1(κ) + κ)dJ(s)
)]
.
Notice that the expectation of the Itoˆ integral is zero since for all s ≥ 0 it holds that V ′κ(Rπ(s)) ∈[
1, ρc∗(s(c∗, x∗1(κ)))
−µ/2σ2ρ
]
. Letting t→∞ we have
Vκ(x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρs
(
dL∗(s)− (x∗1(κ) + κ)dJ(s)
)]
,
which concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Appendix B. The Structure of the Value Function in [7]
We include a quick description of the structure of the value function in [7] for completeness.
This corresponds to the solution of the HJB equation
max
{
max
α∈[0,1]
{1
2
σ2α2U ′′ + µαU ′ − ρV
}
, 1− U ′(x)
}
= 0.
Proceeding as in Section 3 we have that On (0, x0),
U(x) = c1
(
x
ρ
γ
+ c2
)γ
In this case, however, U(0) = 0, which implies c2 = 0. As a consequence
α(x) = − µ
σ2
U ′(x)
U ′′(x)
= − µ
σ2
(
cρ
(
x
ρ
γ
)γ−1)/(cρ2(γ − 1)
γ
(
x
ρ
γ
)γ−2)
= − µ
σ2
x
γ − 1 .
Equating a(x) = 1 then yields
x0 =
σ2(1− γ)
µ
.
As previously mentioned, in this case x0 is not a free boundary. On (x0, x1) and [x1,∞) things
remain unchanged. Thus, the structure of the value function is
U(x) =


c∗
(
x ργ
)γ
, x ∈ [0, x0);
1
r1r2
(
r22
r2−r1
er1(x−x
∗
1) − r21r2−r1 er2(x−x
∗
1)
)
, x ∈ [x0, x∗1);
(x− x∗1) + r2+r1r1r2 , x ∈ [x∗1,∞).
Here ri is as before, and the pair (c
∗, x∗1) is chosen as to satisfy the smooth–pasting conditions,
as to have V ∈ C2.
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